Map showing states and locations where “error bombings,” has taken place since 2014 in Nigeria.
Beacon Consulting Ltd, a renowned enterprise security risk management company, has called on the executive, legislature and judiciary to collaborate in finding lasting solution to the similar aerial bombings of civilian targets by the military, stating that the Sunday, December 3, 2023 “error bombing”, in Tudun Biri, Igabi LGA of Kaduna State was avoidable.
In a study released to THISAGE at the weekend, the group which said that though prevalent in parts of the North because of the ongoing fight against terrorism and insurgency there, the Kaduna tragedy was one too many in the history of aerial bombing that stretches far to 2014.
It said that the history of similar bombing to Kaduna with casualties started in 2014 in the country and since then Nigeria has recorded 18 such incidents of armed reconnaissance drone strikes on civilians in seven states with 417 casualties. These states are Borno and Yobe in Northeast, the theatre of Boko Haram terrorism, followed by the North Central states of Niger and Plateau, the centre of insurgency and sectarian violence, respectively. Next is the Northwest insurgency states of Kaduna, Zamfara and Jigawa.
The Southeast state of Borno, according to the study, holds the record with seven strike. It started in Daglum in February 2014, killing 20 persons. In the same month, another 20 died in similar circumstances in Kayamla in Kondoga Local Government Area and another 10 in Sambisa in Damboa LGA. This was followed in 2017 by a similar incident in Rann in Kala/Balge LGA, where over 100 died. In April 2020, it was the turn of Sakotoku in Biu LGA, of the state. 17 persons died. There was respite for three years until April 2021, when Mainok in Kaga LGA was hit, leaving 30 dead. In September of that year, it was the turn of Kwatar Daban Masara in Kukawa LGA, where 20 were killed.
Yobe, the neighbouring state to Borno was hit twice in September 2021, first at Buhari in Yanusar LGA, where 12 were killed and over 20 injured and the second was at a Yobe village where 10 persons were killed.
Next in order of numbers is Niger state which is also a hotbed of insurgence, which at a time, held sway in 500 communities in Kaure and Shiroro LGAs. Four “error bombings,” has taken place in the state. Shiroro LGA has been the most -hard hit LGA in the state. In April and August of 2020, Kurebe in Shiroro LGA was hit twice, forst by a military drone, leaving eight dead followed by another attack in Galadima Kogo that led to the death of six. Genu on Rijua LGA in the state was affected in 2021, and two persons were confirmed dead.
Jigawa lost one person to the menace in Kakuna, Safana LGA, in July 2022. Zamfara’ s Tangara village in Anka LGA lost six persons in July, 2022. Before the current incident in Tudun Biri, Igabi LGA of Kaduna State, the state experience a similar fate in Sabon Gida village in Giwa LGA in March 2023.
“The Northwest Nigeria threat terrain has since prompted the use of UAVs as attack vectors, particularly against threat elements associated with banditry. Despite their effectiveness in counter-terrorism efforts, drones can also cause collateral damage to civilians, as depicted in the map, which shows 18 documented armed reconnaissance drone strikes on civilians incidents across seven states across the North,” said Beacon Consulting Ltd in the study sent to THISAGE by its Security Communications Officer, Mr Felix Chukwuebuka Ugwu.
It added that, “These cases have been due to misinformation from generally credible sources (intelligence errors), target misidentification, environmental factors, and communication gaps. The incident further raises concerns about the proliferation of drones within Nigerian security agencies and the lack of guiding principles for their usage within certain institutions.”
In the light of the above, Beacon Consulting called on the government to re-evaluate its existing framework for the acquisition of combat UAVs to ensure that these platforms are operated safely and responsibly by institutions with proven competence in intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.
“Particularly, competencies in associated intelligence such as imagery and geospatial aspects, which ultimately support effective target acquisition best practises, should be embedded in the framework and mainstreamed across the UAV eco-space in Nigeria.
- Next, it suggested that the “coordinating elements in the Nigerian security sector should work with the National Assembly and other law enforcement agencies with weaponized UAVs to make clear standard operating procedures and guidelines for when and how drones can be used by security forces, particularly the military, during domestic operations.
- “In doing this, it is important to note the crucial role that human intelligence assets, such as those managed by the Nigerian Police Intelligence Units and the various agencies and departments in the Ministry of Interior, can play in target acquisition. This minimises the risk of civilian casualties.”
- It urged the government to invest in training and equipping security forces with the necessary skills and technology to operate drones safely and effectively.
- It said that the military, specifically the army, can improve its “intelligence-fusion capabilities to ensure that drone strikes are attended to as a collective, with support from a central command co-ordinating such operations. This allows the support of experts and other decision-makers along the chain of command, supporting the accuracy of target ”
- According to the security management expert, strategic communication imperatives must be deployed in managing military and other security operations as a way of ensuring the whole of government and the whole of society approach.
- Finally, government and military institutions should prioritise transparency and accountability in their investigations into incidents, including drone-related ones.
- “Establishing a robust process for holding personnel accountable for mistakes is crucial not only for preventing abuses but also for repairing strained civil-military relationships. This approach supports the success of counterinsurgency missions by fostering collective local intelligence gathering.”
