The judgment of the Federal High Court, Abuja Division, delivered by Justice Peter Lifu in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/2637/2025, ordering the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to deregister the African Democratic Congress (ADC) and four other political parties, has triggered understandable outrage within legal and political circles. If the reports surrounding the decision are accurate, then the judgment represents not only a troubling departure from settled constitutional principles but also a potentially dangerous precedent for Nigeria’s democracy.
At a time when the nation ought to be broadening democratic participation and strengthening electoral competition, the judiciary appears to have sanctioned a course capable of shrinking the political space and weakening opposition politics. Such an outcome runs contrary to the spirit, philosophy, and general intendment of the framers of the 1999 Constitution.
The Constitution was enacted to dismantle the legacy of authoritarian rule, not to recreate it through legal technicalities. Its architects envisioned a political order founded on inclusiveness, freedom of association, and robust political competition.
Section 40 guarantees the right of citizens to form and belong to political parties. That guarantee was intended to facilitate democratic engagement, not to provide a convenient pathway for extinguishing political platforms.
Political parties are not mere corporate entities subject to routine administrative regulation. They are constitutional vehicles through which citizens organise, mobilise, contest elections, and participate in governance. Any action aimed at terminating their existence must therefore be subjected to the strictest constitutional scrutiny.
Even more disturbing is the timing of the judgment.
Nigeria is gradually approaching another election cycle. Political alliances are forming, opposition forces are regrouping, and citizens are searching for viable alternatives within the political landscape. It is therefore impossible to ignore the political implications of a judicial order that seeks to remove opposition parties from the electoral arena at such a critical moment.
Whether intended or not, the judgment inevitably creates the impression of a proxy war against the opposition. In a democracy, perception matters. Citizens must not only receive justice; they must be confident that justice is being administered without political consequences lurking beneath the surface. For this reason alone, the judgment deserves to be viewed with a considerable degree of caution and skepticism.
More fundamentally, serious procedural questions appear to surround the decision. It has been widely reported that objections were raised and overruled before the trial court and taken up on appeal. Appeal No. CA/ABJ/CV/569/2026, the Court of Appeal had reportedly granted an order staying further proceedings. If that position is accurate, then one must ask a simple but critical question: what authority remained for the lower court to continue with the substantive matter?
The law is settled that jurisdiction is the foundation upon which every judicial proceeding rests. Once a court acts without jurisdiction, no matter how brilliantly reasoned its judgment may be, the entire exercise collapses. A subsisting order of stay of proceedings is not a mere procedural inconvenience. It is a binding directive which must be obeyed unless and until it is set aside by a competent appellate court. The decision therefore appears vulnerable not only on constitutional grounds but also on procedural and jurisdictional grounds.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently leaned in favour of political inclusion rather than exclusion. The jurisprudence flowing from cases such as INEC v. Balarabe Musa & others (2003) demonstrates a clear constitutional preference for expanding democratic participation and preventing unnecessary restrictions on political association. The courts have historically acted as guardians of democratic freedoms, not instruments for narrowing them.
The ultimate irony of this judgment is that it seeks to strengthen democracy by reducing democratic choice. That proposition is inherently contradictory. Democracy flourishes when citizens are presented with competing ideas and multiple political alternatives. It suffers when those alternatives are removed by institutional action.
For these reasons, the judgment stands on precarious legal and constitutional footing. Given the substantial questions surrounding jurisdiction, the apparent existence of a pending appeal, the reported order staying proceedings, and the broader constitutional implications of deregistering opposition parties, there are compelling grounds to believe that the decision will not survive appellate scrutiny.
The survival of a political party should be determined by the electorate at the ballot box, not by judicial orders that risk shrinking the democratic space. If Nigeria’s constitutional democracy is to remain vibrant, inclusive, and competitive, this judgment must not become the standard by which political participation is measured.
The judgment may be cloaked in legality, but it is politically corrosive and procedurally defective. It narrows the democratic arena, delegitimizes elections, and emboldens authoritarian tendencies. Nigerians must view it with a pinch of salt, recognizing it as part of a larger struggle to preserve the integrity of their democracy.
The framers of the 1999 Constitution did not intend for democracy to be reduced to a contest between a few dominant parties. They envisioned a pluralistic system where every voice mattered. To betray that vision is to betray Nigeria itself.
