For one to fully comprehend the recall extent Gen Yakubu Gowon has reached in his brutal propaganda as well as mindless physical and structural attacks on both Gen Odumegwu Ojukwu and the entire Igbo nation, it is absolutely imperative to recast two issues about his career.
The first account is this. In 1962, then Lt Col Aguiyi Ironsi’s house who was the military adviser to the Nigerian High Commission in London, was home to the then Captain Gowon who was at the Staff College in Camberley.
In fact, Gowon became Ironsi’s “military attache” even as he converted Ironsi’s house to his second home. On daily basis while he was in London, Gowon had his meals in Ironsi’s house. He drove around town in Ironsi’s green Mercedes-Benz.
Again, after the January 15, 1966 coup, there were eight officers senior to Gowon whom Ironsi could have appointed as his chief of army staff, but he chose Gowon. These eight officers were Bassey, Ogundipe, Adebayo, Nwawo, Njoku, Ojukwu, Imo and Fajuyi.
Besides, there were about 10 others in the same rank with Gowon who could have also been appointed, thereby leaving him out.
Since the coup consumed Col Kur Muhamned from North, Ironsi, as Chuks Iloegbunam explained in his well researched book; IRONSI: Nigeria, The Army, Power And Politics, Ironsi considered fairness and geo political politics in his choice of Gowon as his chief of army staff since Gowon is a Northerner and the most qualified from that region.
Also, Ironsi saw Gowon as “his son” as Iloegbunm out it, following their closeness in London. And, in the morning of the January 1966 coup, Gowon’s rapid response to Ironsi’s orders on how to crush the plotters also aimed Gowon respects before Ironsi.
Thus, Ironsi made Gowon, a Northerner, not Igbo, his chief of army staff. Yet, Gowon was a master conspirator in the grand conspiracy that staged the mutiny that toppled Ironsi through a bloody coup just six months after.
In his book, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, Alexander Madiebo who was a battalion commander in Kaduna and later the GOC of Biafra Army, chronicled how Gowon sabotaged Ironsi’s regime, providing technical support to Lt Col Usman Hassan, the Northern Region military administrator, Murtala Mohammed, T. Y. Danjuma and the group that overthrew Ironsi.
On the night of the coup, Hilary Njoku who was in the Ironsi’s convey to Ibadan, in his book, Tragedy Without Heroes, recalled how all efforts made to reach Gowon for military assistance failed. Ironsi’s wife later confirmed that she called Gowon on several occasions both on his private and official lines when the news of the coup reached her. She noted with misty eyes that both were functional on the several times she called him but he made himself unavailable.
Now, the questions for Gowon to answer concerning Ironsi’s death are: why didn’t he answer his calls when Lady Ironsi called? Why was he not in Ironsi’s entourage to Ibadan on the night he (Ironsi) was assassinated? Instead, it was a rather junior officer, Danjuma, that was included?
After Ironsi and Fajuyi had been killed on the orders of Gowon, Danjuma then called him in the morning and joyfully informed him “mission accomplished”. And he retorted, ” I am sure you guys handled everything well”. This account was revealed by junior officers who loved Ironsi but very close to Gowon.
As Gowon wrongly emerged the head of state at the expense of eight or more officers superior to him – it was meant to compensate him for his betrayal of Ironsi though he was the most senior from the North – Ojukwu frontally protested.
He said, he could not accept Gowon because nobody had told him the whereabouts of the supreme commander, Ironsi. Even at that, Ojukwu argued that in the absense of Ironsi, Gowon was not the next in command.
The Eastern Nigeria military administrator said after Ironsi there were Babafemi Ogundipe, Robert Adebayo, Hilary Njoku, Philip Effiong, Bassey, Imo, and himself Ojukwu. This made Ojukwu to make the popular statement: “Militarily, Gowon is not my superior”.
In spite of Ojukwu’s rejection, Gowon, assumed power as Nigeria’s second head of state. He achieved this greatness through the blood of his supreme commander who against all odds made him the country’s second chief of army staff after Kur Mohamned. It was desperation at its worst volume. A betrayal of the highest order. And sabotage without boundaries.
Yet, Gowon’s regime allowed the massacre of Ndigbo in Northern Nigeria. First, when he was the chief of army staff, Ironsi entrusted that matter into his hands but he allowed Ndigbo to be killed in Northern streets. Second, it went out of proportion during Gowon’s regime as more than 50,000 Igbo were slaughtered in what Ojukwu described as pogrom.
The Nigerian military leaders agreed to meet in Aburi, Ghana to resolve the crisis which had put the country on the precipice. So, on January 4, 5, 1967, Ojukwu and Gowon, with their team, discussed on ways to solve the disturbances.
Among other agreements reached, Gowon agreed that the country would be administered on a confederate basis which gave the regions more powers. That in a large extent gave Ojukwu victory.
Upon return from Ghana, Gowon started distorting the Aburi agreement which to date is known as Aburi Accord. Rather than implementing the Aburi Accord, Gowon angered Ojukwu by creating Rivers State and South Eastern State out of Eastern Nigeria to weaken Ojukwu’s support base. Ojukwu replied by declaring Eastern Nigeria Republic of Biafra.
It is therefore insulting when Gowon claimed in his autobiography that “OJUKWU BETRAYED PEACE, PUSHED NIGERIA INTO BLOODY CIVIL WAR”.
Gowon’s newly released autobiography, My Life of Service and Allegiance, is riddled with lies, lies and lies. He insisted that “Ojukwu deliberately frustrated all efforts meant to restore peace and order”. This is not true.
According to Gowon, “repeated peace efforts collapsed because Ojukwu allegedly pursued a hidden agenda that made compromise impossible.
“We exhausted every peaceful avenue available to us. But Nigeria had to survive,” Gowon declared.
He added, “What was presented by Ojukwu as the Aburi Accord was, in reality, his own interpretation of our discussions,” Gowon argued.
Let us read the Aburi account from other sources. From Federick Forsyth’s The Biafra Story, came this presentation: “Intellectually Ojukwu towered above the rest, and they seemed to know it. To make sure there was no later misinterpretations as to what had been decided, a complete stenographic record and a tape recording was made of the entire discussion. Later, when Gowon reneged on the agreements, Ojukwu released the entire text of the two- day discussion as a set of six gramaphone records”, (page 88).
The above account from Forsyth, a foreign author, is an indication that Gowon was the one who distorted the Aburi Accord but he now turned round to blame it on Ojukwu.
Another foreign account by John de St Jorre, in his book, The Nigerian Civil War, had this: “Ojukwu, a good battalion commander, a good disciplinarian, a good diplomat and an establishment figure par excellence; clever rather than intellectual, a complex man with undeniable star quality
“Going into the Aburi Conference, Gowon looked and sounded far less assured, certainly honest and well meaning but naive and lacking in confidence with none of the incisive logic of the burly bearded man (Ojukwu), yet with none of the controlled histrionics either. From the Aburi tapes, there is no doubt who is the stronger, more determined, and more mature personality”.
Jorre concluded thus: “Aburi amounted to a de facto confederation, though no one on the Federal side of the table appeared to realize it at the time… For Ojukwu, Aburi a perfect solution.
“At a press conference on January 26, 1967, in Lagos, with much influence from the civil servants and other federalists, Gowon back tracked some distance and produced quite a different interpretations”. This ultimately led Ojukwu to make the famous declaration that “On Aburi We Stand” and the war was made possible. (Pages 90/100).
Let us not bother about the accounts of local authors including Emma Okocha’s Blood On The Niger, Ojukwu’s Because I Am Involved, Alexander Madiebo’s The Nigerian Revolution, Achebe’s There Was A Country, Adewale Ademoyega’s Why We Struck, Ben Gbule’s Nigeria’s Five Majors and Arthur Nwankwo’s The Challenge Of Biafra. This is because Gowon described the books authors Biafra’s propagandists.
Gowon’s autobiography is a book of lies!
